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Introductio&
One form of the new 'responsibility system' in the
Chinese countryside contracts the use of land or other
means of production from the production team
(comprising usually 20 to 40 households) down to
individual households. Under this system, termed
'contracting production to households', households
are free to organise production and to dispose of the
produce as they please, as long as they deliver on
schedule an agreed quota of prescribed goods and do
not hire labour or buy and sell land. This system is
expected to raise the quality of performance in the
countryside because it shifts the weight of responsibility
for profits and losses from the team to the household,
and thereby links individual performance more closely
with income than was the case before [see Gray in this
issue].
In assessing the results of this policy, it is important to
determine not only whether the goal of higher
performance and production levels has been attained,
but also, what effects it is having on the changes of
realising the longer-range goals of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), notably the eventual
voluntary recollectivisation of agricultural production.
Realisation of this latter goal presupposes that
production teams will have adequate capital and
personnel to achieve economies of scale through
further mechanisation of agriculture, and that
inequalities in wealth between households will not
develop so far as to prevent production teams
attempting to recollectivise from being able to offer
substantial material advantages to rich households.
From the perspective of this long-term aim, current
reports suggest that the household-contracting system
is creating problems. Consumption levels appear to be
rising and can be expected to continue to do so because
of a rising number of births. This, in turn, reduces the
amount of surplus available for the production team,
which is supposed to be accumulating savings for
future capital investments. In addition, inequalities in
wealth appear to be on the increase.
'An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Institute of
Development Studies in March 1982, which greatly helped me
clarify my ideas. I am particularly grateful to Ester Boserup,
Christine and Gordon White and Kate Young for valuable
suggestions.
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Currently available data, however, make it difficult to
determine how prevalent these problems are [but see
Crol! 19821. If widespread, they would have serious
consequences for the economy as a whole over the
long term. For this reason, it seems important to
develop methods which can help us ascertain what the
likely consequences of household contracting might
be, even if information on actual conditions is limited.
Data, Method and Basic Assumptions
The major source of data used for this study was a
collection of essays written by 43 Chinese students of
sociology who attended a course I offered in rural and
urban sociology from November 1981 to January 1982
at Nankai University, Tianjin. These students came
from 18 leading Chinese universities. Although only
five students had actually grown up in the countryside,
almost all had worked in production teams for at least
one year. Since they had been selected as the first class
in sociology in China since the subject was banned in
1952, and were in the main highly motivated to
understand Chinese society and to resolve its social
problems, most of the students read avidly all reports
they could obtain about social and economic
conditions, notably internal materials which circulate
among China's political and intellectual elite, but may
not be exported to other countries. I feel that the
essays they wrote provide a wealth of information
which has greatly enriched what I could observe at
first hand on my visits to China in 1980 and 198 1-82.
The answers to two essay questions form the basic core
of this analysis. The first question was: what in your
opinion are the major advantages and disadvantages
of the contracting-to-household system? The second
question, posed after presenting a short summary of
George Foster's theory of the image of limited goods
[Foster 1965], was: do you think that Foster's
hypothesis explaining competition and conflict among
peasants is applicable to Chinese peasants in the past
or present? If not applicable to the present, how would
you describe the peasants' current concerns and
behaviour? This question aimed to determine the
guiding perspective, goals and possible conflicts of
interest existing among the rural population and to
elicit information on emerging inequalities of wealth.
In addition to the essays themselves, four sources of
supplementary data were used: discussions with these
same students, which often clarified or further
elucidated essay answers; the as yet unpublished
results of investigations carried out by these students
on various aspects of rural life during 1980 and 1981;
my own observations and interviews with peasant
families in 1980 and 1981-82; and the results of a prior
detailed analysis concerning Chinese peasant concerns
and typical behaviour patterns based on village-level
accounts describing the process of land reform and
collectivisation conducted by the CCP [Hazard
198 la].
On the basis of an analysis of these sources, the major
concern of Chinese peasants appears to be - as it was
during earlier phases of the organisational trans-
formation of the Chinese countryside - the concern
for securing a material existence. I mean by this that ifa
Chinese peasant2 were confronted with the alternative
of acquiring great wealth far exceeding his material
subsistence needs at high risk or of obtaining an
adequate but small income at low risk, he would
choose the latter.3 The following essay answer is
typical:
as for peasants' value orientations, their major
interest is the desire to acquire material security.
Therefore, their main aim is to secure food and to
seek security. They do not desire luxuries going
beyond these basic needs. Even now, with the
modernisation of agriculture, the situation has not
changed much.
If this is the primary interest of Chinese peasants, then
we must view behaviour patterns which appear most
frequently and regularly among the majority of the
rural population as representing risk-avoiding or risk-
reducing strategies.4 If, for instance, higher con-
sumption levels, more children and the revival of clans
2 When using the term 'peasant' I am referring to the head of the
household who makes the major decisions concerning investment
and consumption. I do not rule out the possibility that sons,
daughters and wives may have different perspectives. Their views,
however, are not the subject of this paper.
Many other studies have also explained the behaviour of peasants
living close to the subsistence level as motivated primarily by the
concern to reduce risks and uncertainty. [See especially: Cancian
1967 and 1972; Lipton 1968; Migdal 1974; Ortiz 1973, 1979 and
1980; Scott 1973 and 1976; Wharton 1963 and papers by Wharton,
ftehrman, Mellor and Myint in Wharton (cd) 1969 and Wolf 1979].
Although this paper basically agrees with these authors, it diverges
on details, since Chinese peasants today face a certain combination
of risks which is specific to their situation.
In concentrating on peasants' concern for security, I do not wish to
imply that peasants have no other interests (such as the desire for
material comfort, satisfaction in their work or relaxation and
entertainment outside of work). I am, however, claiming that these
latter interests are not primary movers of peasant behaviour. They
are interests which influence behaviour only when the primary
interest in security is being adequately met. Thus, my concentration
on this major interest means that I cannot explain all behaviour-
choices of peasants. However, I would claim that I am explaining
those which are most likely to occur regularly among the majority of
the peasant population.
really are frequent phenomena, then it should be
possible to explain these patterns as attempts to reduce
or avoid risks. This paper will concentrate of
identifying the major uncertainties in securing a
material existence today under the household-
contracting system and describing how households are
most likely to try to reduce or avoid these
uncertainties. Because of the lack of adequate data, it
will not be possible here to differentiate risk structures
and strategy-responses for different regions. However,
it should be kept in mind that considerable regional
variation is probably likely.
The Structure of Risks under Socialist
Household Production
Although the peasants are working hard under the
household-contracting system, many are working
hard because they are afraid (that is) because their
livelihood is uncertain. In my village, many are
saying, 'What if we don't get the harvest in on time?
What if, after handing in our quota we don't have
enough to eat?'
In particular, the essays indicate that rural households
with contracts to teams are particularly concerned
about their control over access to land and labour.
Risks in access to land
Frequent reference was made to problems connected
with the style of implementation of the household-
contracting system. The following quote is typical:
a widespread problem of the household-contracting
system is the way it is implemented. In some
production teams, no written contract is made, so
that, if the team changes its mind, the peasants have
no way of insisting on their rights. Even ifa written
contract exists, it may not set down all the details.
Often, for instance, the duration of the contract is
not stated, so that the peasants do not know how
long they can use the land. In my village, where the
contracting system has been carried out for two
seasons, this problem has been corrected. But in the
neighbouring villages there are still problems.
Also, there is the problem of how the land is to be
distributed. Everyone wants the best land, and the
cadres try to distribute this land equally and fairly,
but this means that each year you probably do not
receive the same piece of land. Because the criteria
for distribution are not clear, the peasants worry
whether they will get land that is fertile and
conveniently located.
Even more frequently, reference was made to the
uncertain duration of the policy of household-
contracting as such:
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when the peasants ask them, some team cadres say
that the policy will last only three to five years.
Others say it will last for their lifetime. In reality, no
one really knows, and the newspapers are also not
clear (on this point). But the peasants want to be
able to set up a (long-term) plan. This situation
makes it difficult for them, and they feel worried.5
Risks in access to labour
This year, my father was ill and my paternal uncle
came to help out. My mother wrote me: 'What
would we have done without your uncle? Our life
now is not easy'. Other households in the village
also have problems of labour power. Some send
their sons to the city to work on construction while
others are short of workers and have too many
mouths to feed. In the past, this wasn't so serious
because the collective (production team) produced
the grain and you could borrow extra grain if you
did not earn enough through workpoints. Now,
there is no collective grain, or if there is, everyone is
too busy on their own field to pay attention to
families with hardships. Even organising occasional
labour between households is difficult because the
cadres must also earn their livelihoods from their
own manual labour and have no time to help
others.
This and other essays indicate that peasants under the
household-contracting system are particularly con-
cerned about securing appropriate amounts of labour
power both on a daily, and on a periodic basis. The
problem of daily access derives from the fact that the
hiring of labour is officially not allowed, and
households must depend mainly on the labour
available in their own households, supplemented by
informal arrangements with kin. Since households are
biological and social units following specific develop-
mental cycles, the ratio of dependents to labourers
inevitably varies over time, leading to temporary
excesses or shortages of labour, which in some way
must be ironed out. In addition, households are far
smaller than production teams, so that the material
consequences of illness or death of one member are
more immediately and strongly felt than would be the
case under the collective organisation of production.
Finally, the household-contracting system appears to
have weakened the local system of leadership, so that
the responsibility for securing adequate labour on an
occasional basis is thrown back on individual
Risks in access to land are, of course, still lower than in capitalist
societies, where peasants may lose access to land entirely. The
concern for future access to land indicated in my data suggests that
Chinese peasants are comparing their situation today with the
situation in the period immediately prior to it, when production
teams not only owned the land, but also organised and managed its
cultivation as a collective.
households. Since labour-hiring is not permitted, the
peasants must rely on informal bonds of reciprocal
obligation. These bonds, however, appear not to beso
strong that households feel secure in the willingness
and reliability of kin, friends and neighbours to help
out when they are urgently needed.
In sum, peasants today under the household-
contracting system appear to view their access to land
and labour as less secure than under the prior system
of production organisation within the production
team.
Common strategy-responses
According to the essays, peasants are responding to
these risks in similar ways, so that certain patterns of
response are discernible.
Responses to the Problem of Land Access
Three responses to the problem of land access are most
frequently cited: clientelism, the predatory exploitation
of the land, and the emphasis on sidelines.
Clientelism One means of reducing the risks
involved in acquiring secure access to land is to give
'gifts' of services or goods to those cadres who
negotiate production contracts (usually production
team cadres) in the hopes that these will reciprocate by
taking their interests into account. Although social
opportunism, as it is often called by my respondents, is
mentioned, it appears to be less common than the
other two strategies mentioned below. One reason for
this might be that the political risks involved are high.
Campaigns with the purpose of criticising local leaders
who accept bribes and exercise favouritism have
occurred at periodic intervals in many rural areas.
Leaders can therefore be expected to be wary of
accepting gifts of this kind, and peasants would hardly
want to take the risk of having leaders, under the
pressure of criticism, accuse them of being initiators of
such 'gift-giving' exchanges.
Predatory exploitation of the land One respondent
describes this tendency in the following words:
the system gives peasants the right to use but not
rights of ownership. This is a problem which does
not help in improving the conditions of production.
Because the peasants know that they will be giving
back the land to the production team, either at the
end of the season or when the policy changes, they
do not take care of the soil, and go all out in
exploiting it. In this way, the land becomes
increasingly impoverished.
Although the government obviously does not condone
such behaviour, one respondent points out that
households which pursue it are more likely to avoid
criticism than in the past because of the widespread
propagation of the slogan: whoever gets rich is
glorious, whoever remains poor is a (stupid) bear.
In principle, the slogan intends to praise only those
who get rich by their own efforts and use the means
of production responsibly. In fact, however, it
makes it easier for dishonest and careless people to
get rich through cunning and the misuse of the
means of production.
Today, everyone competes with each other to see
who can get rich fastest. The way you get rich is of
no concern. Whichever method makes you rich
most quickly is (seen as) the best method.
As an earlier quotation indicated, this competition to
get rich by the fastest means possible should be
understood not as an expression of rationally planned
profit-maximisation, but rather as a strategy to obtain
a modicum of security - an economic cushion under
circumstances of high risk.
Emphasis on sidelines:
if the responsibility system is allowed to develop
too far, it may prevent a further development of
agriculture. Team members like sidelines because
they can improve their incomes faster than in
agriculture (je land cultivation), and the work is
less hard. Further, it is a more secure source of
income than agriculture because you are not
dependent on the production team to give you the
necessary means of production. The more is
invested in sidelines, however, the more the
cultivation of the land is neglected.
This excerpt indicates that, under the responsibility
system, where access to land is less secure than under
the prior system, production in sidelines takes on new
significance as a risk-avoiding strategy. In addition to
the advantages domestic sidelines have always had
over land cultivation (the quicker profits and lighter
work load noted above), it has the additional
advantage under the responsibility system of reducing
the dependency of the household on the whims of team
cadres and the vicissitudes of policy changes. If
current publication emphases are any indication,
domestic sidelines production, and especially the
raising of pigs and chickens, and the making of
clothes, is undergoing a literal boom.
Familial Responses to the Problem of Labour
Because hiring of labour is not permitted, households
are forced to adopt familial solutions to their labour
problems. Although the prohibition of labour-hiring
existed prior to the household contracting system, we
have seen that the risks in labour access deriving from
household-based production have increased. As a
consequence, a successful resolution of the labour
problem is today not merely a question of relative
advantage, but has taken on existential significance.
Joint family and more children Two strategies are
being adopted as a means to reduce the risks linked
with the small size of the production unit: the
prolongation of the joint family phase in the
developmental cycle (when at least two married
brothers live together with their families), and more
children. While the first strategy offers a quick
solution to the problem of size raised by the
household-contracting system, the latter strategy pays
off only in the long-run after the children have reached
an age when their labour power can contribute to
household income. Despite the uncertainties perceived
concerning the duration of the current policy, the
planning of large families was one of the most
frequently mentioned responses to the household-
contracting system in the essays:
the household-contracting system makes the
family planning campaign ineffective because
having many sons is an advantage.
Although there is a surplus of labour already, this
system makes matters even worse.
The family planning campaign could only work
when the production team could impose material
sanctions on households. Now, with the responsi-
bility system, everyone produced their own food.
The production team does not have the power
anymore to withhold grain.
The main reasons given for the desire for more
children, despite the uncertainty of future policy and
the increasing man/land ratio was seen to be the
increased emphasis on domestic sidelines. In sidelines,
children can be productive for the household earlier
than in land cultivation. Furthermore, the household
can provide them with employment, even if land is, in
the future, not allotted according to the number of
labourers in the family.
But why do even the richer households appear to
prefer to reduce the risks of small workforce size by an
enlargement of the workforce, rather than through the
purchase of labour-saving machines and/or draft
animals? The answer appears to lie in the greater
political risks connected with such a strategy:
during collectivisation, the wealthier households
had to hand over their draft animals and large
implements to the collective. These households
have not forgotten their losses. Since the
responsibility system will not exist forever, they do
not want to repeat the experiences they had then. If
you have many children, however, the collective
does not expect you to hand them over in the same
way. You only lend the collective their labour for
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part of the day, and during that time, they are
earning workpoints.
Another respondent points out a second political risk
involved: 'who knows whether the model peasants of
today will be labelled as "capitalists" later on?'
Marriage timing and marriage finance An important
strategy for ironing out inconstancies in the labour
force due to births and deaths is the timing of marriage
and childbirths. In this way, a situation can be avoided
in which both the oldest and the youngest generation
are simultaneously dependents of the working
members of the household. Ideally, children should be
entering the production process at the time when
grandparents are leaving it.
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Realising this idea, however, is easier said than done.
Even assuming that potential wives are adequately
available, financing a wife appears to be an
increasingly expensive undertaking for households
with unmarried sons. In particular, brideprices and
the expenses connected with nuptial ceremony are
rising. Some respondents explained the increasing
expense of marriage as being due to the increased
value of women both as mothers and as workers under
the household-contracting system.6 As mothers, they
are more valuable because the value of children has
risen. As workers, their value has risen, because they
are assuming work in sidelines, their traditional work
area.7
The burden on household expenditure has been
further aggravated by the prohibition on the part of
the government of investment in land. In pre-
Communist rural society, one of the main means of
displaying wealth and security in order to obtain a wife
was investment in land. This means of display,
although hardly inexpensive, had the advantage of
being at one and the same time both display article and
capital investment. Today, display must take different
forms. Although capital goods such as a sewing
machine or a pig can also serve this dual function, they
are less expensive and therefore less indicative of
wealth and security than land was in the past. As a
consequence, households must adopt additional
means of displaying wealth.
An apparent favourite object for this purpose is the
building or the expansion of a house. Building
materials are in many regions of rural China very
expensive, so that the size of a house is a good
indicator of wealth.8 In addition, it is also a sign of
security because on the one hand it concentrates in one
brideprices have varied in both pre-1949 and socialist China
according to the value of females as labourers is discussed by Cr011
[1981:50-54] and Parish and Whyte {1978:181,186ff]. The close
relation between brideprice and the female's work contribution to
the household is also noted for other societies by Boserup [1970].
Certain sidelines were traditionally done by men, such as carpentry,
metal-working and Chinese medicine [Cohen 1976:88]. However,
those which seem most prevalent in the Chinese countryside today,
perhaps because they require little specialised training, namely pig-
and poultry-raising and textiles, were traditional women's work
[Cohen 1976:147], and appear to remain so today [see Cmli
1977:805; Hazard 1981e; Parish and Whyte 1978:205]. For the
central importance of female labour for the proper functioning of
the household as a production unit under collectivised agriculture,
see CroO [1981:152-61.
For Instance, in Yuelu Brigade near Changsha, one family had spent
1300 yuan on a simple small house built of bricks with a packed clay
floor. It had taken them three years to save this amount, and the cost
was considered very low, since a large proportion of the building
materials came from the old house which had been torn down, and
they also had paid nothing to the neighbours and relatives who
helped build the house. In almost all family interviews, the pride in
the house and the preoccupation with plans for its expansion were
noted.o C o o.
location a large number of persons, so that
cooperation of married brothers in production on a
daily basis is more likely, and on the other, it provides
adequate space so that nuclear family units (married
brothers and their wives and children) have some
privacy, thus reducing the likelihood of seriously
strained relations, which is a common characteristic of
joint families. Apart from these expenses, consumer
goods are now also becoming objects of wealth display
and marriage finance.
Clan and affinai ties
The adoption of familial solutions applies also to the
problem of organising large workforces. Two
channels for organising labour at this level are clan
membership and affinai ties [see Gallin 1966:151;
Parish and Whyte 1978:172]. In both instances,
measures must be taken to ensure that a basis for
cooperation exists, even when no cooperation is
necessary at the moment. One means of strengthening
clan bonds is the tightening of rules of clan exogamy
[see Granet 1930:154; Parish and Whyte 1978:171].
Another means applicable to both clan and affinai ties
is the cultivation of customary ceremonial exchanges
of small gifts and services.9
Implications for China's future socialist
development
Is household production in the PRC in the long-run
incompatible with socialist development? Specifically,
how will the likely strategy-responses of peasants
under the household-contracting system affect the
prospect of recollectivisation?
At present, these prospects appear bleak. Production
teams will have difficulty accumulating capital for
future purchases as long as households continue to
adopt a 'get-rich-quick' attitude. Since in the past,
production team cadres proved often to be incompetent
in managing team production, there is a lack of
confidence in the ability of the production team to
organise production efficiently in the future. Also the
training of young people to take on future leadership
positions within the collective is unlikely to be a
spontaneous outgrowth of the household-contracting
system, since on the one hand, the skills needed to
enhance household income today are not the same as
those needed to organise large-scale production, and
on the other hand, children are attending school less
regularly, because they are being integrated into the
household production process (especially sidelines)
starting at an early age.
For these customary exchanges in their various forms in pre-1949
and present-day China, [see Croll 1981:45-54; Granet 1930:156ff,
161-5; Hsiao 1967:333-44; Parish and Whyte 1978:185; Wolfe
1972:119-271.
Furthermore, inequalities in wealth between house-
holds, which would also jeopardise the chances for
future recollectivisation, can be expected to increase,'5
despite the government's prohibition that land and
labour be marketable commodities. An intrinsic
characteristic of the household-contracting system is
that it discriminates against households with relatively
less labour power. This source of inequality is
accompanied, however, by four others, all of which, in
combination, increase inequalities even more. First,
even with equal numbers of workers, levels of
performance vary considerably between households
based on differences in work motivation, work
discipline and skills. Second, the same level of
expenditure for marriage financing is more 'expensive'
(relative to income) for a poor household than for a
rich one. At the same time, it is (ironically) less
effective in securing female labour and reproductive
power, since its wealth display is not as convincing as a
wealthier household, being usually connected with
cutbacks in consumption in such vital areas as food
intake [Crol! 1981:53 note; Wolf 1972:144]. This
differential effect of the same expenditure level for
marriage financing is reflected in the tendency for
poorer households both to marry their sons to women
who are considerably older than they are (and often
widowed, making their brideprice even lower), and to
lose their daughters-in-law on the grounds of not
having been 'kept' well."
A third source of inequality is the government's
current propagation of the slogan, 'whoever gets rich
is glorious, whoever remains poor is a (stupid) bear'.
This slogan, which appears to have gained wide
currency in the villages, embodies in effect the creed of
survival of the fittest. Those who are poor because
they do not have adequate labour power at their
disposal and who are needy of aid from the production
team's welfare fund, are conveniently stigmatised as
stupid by their better-off neighbours, in turn making a
refusal to support such families out of the welfare fund
easier.'2 Although such families do not starve, but
instead receive grain from the production team in the
form of loans, they are still put in debt to the team.
'° For the equalising effects of certain features of collectivised
agriculture prior to the introduction of the household-contracting
system, [see Tsou, Blecher. Meisner, 1979, Part II, esp. pp 155-180].
For an opposing emphasis, concentrating on sources of inequality
including those between households and therefore presaging many
of the current problems, [see Nolan and White 1979].
[Parish and Whyte 1978:193,198]. lam here, however, understating
the case. Normally, it is precisely the poorer households which must
pay a higher brideprice, because they cannot offer the girl
comfortable living conditions [see Croll 1980:52, and Parish and
Whyte 1978:190!].
12 Before the introduction of the household-contracting system, team
members were apparently extremely reluctant to support team
members who had no family to provide for them out of the team's
welfare fund [Davis-Friedman 1978]. The equalising effect of the
welfare fund and other social services is discussed by [Ng l979:55ff].
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Apart from this misuse of the government's slogan,
the creed of survival of the fittest is also convenient in
covering up less acceptable ways of getting rich,
namely those which are not based on the fruits of one's
own physical effort (the officially commended way to
get rich), but are rather a result of cunning and
trickery.
Finally, membership of a clan which is large and
cohesive enough both to organise bigger work teams
effectively and to ensure access to such crucial
resources as water at times when weak water is scarce
has definite advantages. Although clan ties in general
cross-cut lines of economic cleavage so that poor and
rich households might belong to the same clan, thus
counteracting the increasing inequalities arising from
the other two factors discussed above, it is also
possible to imagine a system where clan strength and
economic wealth reinforce each other. For instance, if
a clan has control over the main water sources, the
wealthier members might find it advantageous to
permit even the poorest members of the clan access to
the water, so as to avoid divisiveness which would
weaken their political position vis-à-vis other clans in
the village.
Household Production and Socialism:
an Uneasy Alliance?
Although these are the likely consequences of the
household-contracting system under present con-
ditions, the question still remains whether they are
necessary concomitants of it, or whether steps can be
taken to remove or at least reduce the severity of these
consequences, while still retaining the basic policy of
household production.
A review of the determinants of peasant behaviour
makes it evident that they are responding to a
combination of factors connected only in part with the
household-contracting system. The household-con-
tracting system makes household composition even
more important than in the past, but the strategies
open to peasants to resolve their labour problems are
circumscribed by a policy independent of the
responsibility system, the prohibition of labour-hiring
and investment in land. Similarly, both the risks in
access to land linked with an incorrect implementation
of the system, and the slogan legitimising the wealthy
and stigmatising the poor can be removed. But the
greater uncertainty concerning the duration of current
policy cannot, as long as a socialist state persists which
claims the right to determine production policy in the
countryside.
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